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SUMMARY RECORD OF FOURTH MEETING OF
QUADRIPARTITE WORKING GROUP ON GERMANY AND BERLIN
FEBRUARY 5, 1960

Participants:France

Mr. Winkler
 Mr. Manet

Germany

Mr. Krapf
 Mr. Osterheld

United Kingdom

Lord Hood
 Mr. Logan

United States

GER - Mr. Hillenbrand
 Mr. McKiernan
 L/EUR - Mr. Kearney
 SOV - Mr. McSweeney
 Mr. Dean

Defense - Col. Schofield

Mr. Hillenbrand opened the meeting by posing for discussion the question of a report to NATO on the activities of the Working Group. Lord Hood said that he supposed the Group did have an obligation to make periodic reports but the interval of these reports had not been established. Mr. Krapf said that judging on the basis of past NATO experience, it would not be necessary to make a report until actual progress made by the Working Group justified such a report. Mr. Winkler suggested that the Group did not yet have anything of substance to report. Mr. Hillenbrand noted that the Working Group faced a dilemma in this regard in that the really substantive stage of its work would come later on, while on the other hand if NATO did not receive regular reports of activities there might be a feeling that the powers participating in the Working Group were not living up to their obligations to inform and consult with NATO. Lord Hood agreed with the suggestion from Mr. Hillenbrand that the U.S. side prepare a draft report to NATO for discussion at the next meeting of the Working Group intended for possible submission to NATO for the NAC meeting of February 16. Lord Hood suggested that the Working Group participants query their respective NATO Permanent Representatives for an opinion as to how frequently NATO would expect reports from the Working Group. Mr. Hillenbrand noted that it would be desirable if we could make clear to NATO that, owing to the fact that Germany and Berlin was only one phase of the preparations for the summit, much of the determination of summit tactics would have to await the results of discussion on disarmament and East-West relations. The heaviest work of the Working Group would take place at a later phase of the preparations so

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that there would probably not be much progress in the earlier stages to incorporate in reports to NATO if they had to be periodic.

Mr. Hillenbrand said he would like to review the discussion of the past three meetings to determine what papers should be written and what assignments carried out by the Working Group in the immediate future. He said the first item was a review of the Western Peace Plan and suggested that if any of the participants had thoughts on this subject they could develop them at the next meeting of the Working Group. Our feeling was that there was little gain to be made through improvement of the form or style of the Western Peace Plan which, after all, had been the result of lengthy negotiation and discussion last year with compromises from all sides, so that the only changes which had a logical place would be those of substance, though we had no proposals on substance at this point. Lord Hood said the U.K. approach was broadly the same and that the U.K. had no "bright ideas" to add to the Peace Plan which was a good document as it stood. Mr. Krapf said that his view was the same. Mr. Hillenbrand suggested that the Working Group's written report to NATO might inform NATO that no proposals for revision of the Peace Plan had been made in the course of a preliminary review of the Peace Plan, but that the Working Group would, of course, be interested in any thoughts which the other NATO countries might have on this subject. Mr. Winkler said the Peace Plan was a standing document of historical record setting forth the Western position and that there was no reason to change it. Mr. Hillenbrand said that the Peace Plan theoretically was open to change if this were agreed to be desirable, just as the Peace Plan itself represented a modification of the Western position on German unity as of Geneva 1955, but such changes did not seem desirable at the present point.

Mr. Hillenbrand said the French paper brought before the Group containing the idea of presenting principles or requirements for a Berlin solution reflected a valuable approach in the light of the limitations of time at the summit. He asked the other participants to give final views on the French paper at the next meeting.

With regard to the papers tabled by the German delegation, Mr. Hillenbrand asked if the Germans would be prepared to respond to the questions the U.S. had asked about their underlying assumptions. Mr. Hillenbrand also asked if other participants had comments on the German paper. It was true that we would have to wait for the final tactics paper on Germany and Berlin for further results from the Disarmament and East-West Relations Working Groups, but the Working Group might consider moving ahead now to prepare a draft of underlying assumptions on Western tactics on Berlin. Lord Hood commented that the Foreign Office had been much in favor of the idea of first formulating Western requirements for a Berlin solution and then studying and enumerating ways of meeting them. Once the requirements had been formulated and agreed upon, it might be possible to meet them in various ways. Mr. Krapf

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said that the approach described by Lord Hood appealed to him since with it there was no necessity to formulate a minimum Western position which then might become known to the press. Lord Hood said the Working Group's task was to consider a number of possibilities. The Foreign Ministers' meeting in April could then eliminate certain of these possibilities and give the group instructions for its further work. Mr. Hillenbrand noted that the Working Group should feel itself able to consider various possibilities even if they were unorthodox in terms of the Group's present thinking. Lord Hood agreed.

Mr. Hillenbrand said that we would welcome comments on the U.S. plebiscite proposal. If agreed that it was useful, it could then be worked into the final German tactics paper. The plebiscite proposal was admittedly only a tactical maneuver since Soviet rejection must be expected.

Mr. Hillenbrand asked if the Germans would be ready to produce a paper describing in detail existing political and economic links between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. Mr. Krapf said that such a paper would be produced. He noted that another paper prepared by the German Foreign Office which had received a certain amount of newspaper comment would be transmitted today. He said the present paper was merely a collection of historical and current information whose purpose was merely to give a background synopsis for the use of the Western participants at the summit. It did not, as had been maintained in newspaper commentary, claim any special veto right for the Federal Republic.

Mr. Hillenbrand noted that Mr. Laloy had suggested a paper on possible forms of Soviet harassment of Berlin. He requested that the French Foreign Office be asked if it wished to prepare a draft of such a paper. Mr. Winkler noted that what Mr. Laloy may have been referring to was the subject of Western contingency planning.

Mr. Hillenbrand said that Mr. Laloy had also suggested that the Working Group obtain an appraisal of the required strength of Western garrisons in Berlin, not only from the military but also from the public safety point of view. He suggested that the Working Group participants obtain this evaluation through their own channels.

Mr. Hillenbrand said that the U.S. papers on the Japanese peace treaty and Viet-Nam elections might be considered as background papers for the summit meeting unless corrected or amended by suggestions of other participants and later used as potential briefing material for the summit participants should the Soviets bring up the subject matter. Mr. Logan mentioned the previous suggestion of Mr. Laloy concerning a rebuttal point based on Soviet control over two Japanese islands. Mr. Hillenbrand said that perhaps it would be useful to note in the paper on the Japanese peace treaty with regard to the Soviet desire to conclude a separate peace treaty with the East Zone

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of Germany that the U.S. had not even mentioned the Soviet-administered Japanese Island of Sakhalin in the peace treaty with Japan. One might argue that this was a more appropriate analogy with the Berlin situation.

Mr. Hillenbrand noted that the U.S. side had distributed copies of the Secretary's proposal of May 26, 1959 for a unified administration of greater Berlin as a device for drawing Working Group attention to this subject. If, as Mr. Laloy had earlier proposed, the Western powers placed more emphasis on a solution valid for all of Berlin, it would be necessary to modify the Herter paper to remove the references to the Western Peace Plan.

Mr. Krapf said that his Government was in favor of this approach but that Article V of the Herter proposal, which mentions a mixed German commission, should be omitted since this proposal was advanced as part of a plan for reunification and should not be included if a Berlin solution was to be negotiated in isolation. Mr. Hillenbrand said the U.S. side would undertake to eliminate this proposal and all other connection with the Peace Plan from the proposal. It was clear that this proposal was non-negotiable but it might have tactical merits. Mr. Winkler said that the French side felt that the Western Peace Plan was extremely complex and difficult to understand for the general public but that it would be possible to put forth a proposal on an all-Berlin solution which would be much clearer and more easily understood by the public and which would also contain a greater degree of reciprocity of concessions from both sides. Mr. Hillenbrand said that Berlin public opinion was originally cool towards this proposal but that the objections which had been raised did not appear serious. Mr. Krapf agreed and suggested a minor amendment of the proposal to include a paragraph giving the right to the all-Berlin City Government to take over laws from other parts of Germany and to apply them in Berlin. Mr. Hillenbrand noted that there had been a shift in emphasis in recent Soviet propaganda on Berlin which now stressed an attack on the relationship between Berlin and the Federal Republic. He noted that the Western problem was in part that there was no agreed version of this relationship. The relationship had developed not on the basis of logic but in order to meet ad hoc requirements.

Lord Hood asked if the German side would be ready in the future to amplify a point in one of the German papers regarding the desirability of understanding improvements in communications between Berlin and Western Germany. Mr. Krapf said the German side would be willing to do so. One thing we might ask for would be simplification of procedures at the Zonal border on such matters as automobile papers. It could be demonstrated, for example, that it was far easier to cross the borders of any Western European country, including the Federal Republic, than to go to Berlin. Mr. Krapf noted that this approach was intended in the tactical sense and might gain greater public understanding for the Western position. Mr. Hillenbrand noted that it was highly unlikely that the Soviets would in fact agree to such improvements. He asked if there were other areas of study which the

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Working Group might go into.

Mr. Krapf noted that the Federal Republic was in complete agreement with the idea of a plebiscite as suggested by the U.S. but definitely preferred the first set of questions contained in the American paper. Lord Hood asked what we would do if the Soviets asked embarrassing counter-questions. Mr. Hillenbrand said that this was quite possible. For example, they might ask whether the German people favored banning of nuclear arms in German territory. The Germany and Berlin tactics paper should suggest ways of handling this situation if the plebiscite proposal were included in the paper. It would be desirable for the Working Group to examine this possibility and work out lines of rebuttal for inclusion in the tactics paper.

Mr. Krapf asked if it would be desirable to combine the Working Group's earlier paper on Soviet intentions with the more recent German paper on this same subject. Mr. Hillenbrand said that work on this could best be done by a one- or two-man editorial subcommittee.

Mr. Hillenbrand concluded by noting that the Working Group would have to be continued at a rather slow pace. The basis of the Western position had already been laid in the preparations for and during the Geneva Conference in 1959; an important task of the Group would be to prepare a basic paper on tactics. For various reasons which were understood by members of the Group, it was too early to begin serious work on this paper. On the other hand, it would be desirable for the Group to meet at least once a week so that the press would not get an incorrect impression of complacency or disinterest from the Western powers on the Berlin question. It was agreed that the Group should meet again on or about February 11.

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